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1. The Cold War and the Struggle for Modernization in the South
The Cold War was never merely a conflict between two superpowers with competing geopolitical  
ambitions.  It  was  a  struggle  for  “hearts  and  minds”,  too:  the  US  and  the  USSR  carried, 
respectively,  the  flags  of  capitalist  and  socialist  paths  to  modernity, and  the  two  alternative 
ideological systems soon translated into geopolitical realities since 1917. After WWII the bipolar 
competition focused in the European and East Asian arenas in the form of strategic and military  
disputes. Once the US and the USSR consolidated the defence of their nearest allies, they turned  
their attention to the ongoing decolonization process. Washington and Moscow soon realized that 
the ultimate success of their universalist projects also depended heavily on the future orientation 
of the new independent states1. 
The decline of colonial empires, the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the birth of the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NLM) helped set the framework for a global, bipolar competition: here, 
the main issues at stake were political independence and economic development. Both concepts 
were structurally embedded within the notion of modernity because the sovereign, fast-growing 
nation-state was to be the basic unit for political action and economic organization.2 The need for 
change in the so called Third World was first emphasised by the rising nationalist elites. However, 
the question was: which kind of modernization? Liberal  democracy or revolutionary marxism? 
Free-market economy or state-led development? Or, none of these but a third-way? At that point,  
the  two  superpowers  and  their  allies  came  in  and  offered  several  competing  models  of 
development, most of which were based on their own historical experience. Third World leaders 
1 The paper is based on the author’s Ph.D research, Which kind of Modernity for Syria? The Birth of  
the Ba’thist Regime in the Shadow ofthe Berlin Wall, 1963-1970, April 2008, Florence, as well as on 
the Workshop “Modernization as a Global Project: American, Soviet, and European Approaches”, held 
at the German Historical Institute, Washington D.C. March 2008. See also Odd Arne Westad,  The 
Global Cold War (Cambridge, 2005), 86, 97; Marc T. Berger, The Battle for Asia. From decolonization  
to globalization  (London, 2004);   David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, eds.  Staging 
Growth:  Modernization,  Development,  and  the  Global  Cold  War (Amherst,  2003);   Nils,  Gilman, 
Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore, 2003). For a broader 
overview, see Giovanni Arrighi, Beverly J. Silver, Chaos and governance in the modern world system 
(Minneapolis, 1999).
2 Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century (London, 1994), 56. According to Arrighi, since 1500, 
one of the main features of modern history has been the changing alliance between the capitalist and 
“territorial” forces: the first being transnational in tendency, the second exerting power over population  
and  territory.  In  Europe,  the  nation-state  was  the  historical  result  of  such  combination  and  later 
became a major legacy for the institutional development of the rest of the world. 
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were  generally  aware  of  the  opportunities  as  well  as  of  the  risks:  they  could  exploit  such 
competition to secure the greatest possible material assistance, but their national priorities could 
well be undermined by the politics of the bipolar conflict. If the Bandung Conference and the NLM 
tried to set up a common third-world framework for national security and economic development, 
such issues translated differently in every single region: for the current Arab leaderships, security 
mainly involved central state consolidation over centrifugal forces as well as the disruptive conflict  
with Israel.3
2. The Two Germanys in the Middle East
Since the XVII century Middle Eastern intellectuals and politicians had been under pressure to 
react to structural events such as European capitalist expansion and later colonial rule across the 
region. Both religious and secular movements tried to find an answer to the multiple challenges 
posed by European modernity. Such answers ranged from rejection to selective absorption of 
features  like  secularism,  liberalism,  nationalism  and  industrial  patterns  of  development.  The 
countries most entangled in the Middle East (France, Great Britain and Germany) represented 
some  of  the  main  points  of  reference.  From the  late  nineteenth  century,  imperial  Germany 
championed itself as a political, cultural and technological partner for the Ottoman rulers as well 
as for their nationalist heirs: one should consider the impact of German military education and 
training on the many officials who later became the leaders of nationalist movements across the 
Arab world, as well as the influence played by German philosophy and political doctrine on Arab 
nationalist  thinkers;  the  same  Nazi  Germany  tried  to  exploit  the  Arab  resentment  against 
European colonizers in its struggle for continental hegemony, too.4 In the 1920s, another political 
competitor entered the stage: the founding of the “Congress of the People of the East” in Baku in 
1920  set  the  stage  for  socialist  and  communist  entanglement  in  future  national-liberation 
movements.5
After WWII, the two Germanys lay at the heart of the European Cold War, yet not entirely 
between  its  poles.  For  a  long  while  German  ruling  élites  established  themselves  as  the 
champions  of  their  own  blocs,  refusing  to  legitimate  the  autonomous  existence of  the  other 
3 Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East (Manchester, 2003), 54.
4 Wolfgang Schwanitz, “Paschas, Politiker und Paradigmen: Deutsche Politik im Nahen und Mittleren 
Osten, 1871-1945, in Wolfgang Schwanitz eds.  Deutschland und der Mittlere Osten (Leipzig, 2004), 
22-46; Bassam Tibi,  Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State (London, 1997).  W.O. 
Henderson “German Economic Penetration in the Middle East, 1870-1914”,  The Economic History  
Review, 18, 1/2 (1948), 54-64; Wolfgang Schwanitz, Gold, Bankiers und Diplomaten: zur Geschichte  
der  Duetschen  Orientbank,  1906-1946  (Berlin,  2002);  Francis  R.  Nicosia  “Arab  Nationalism  and 
National  Socialist  Germany,  1933-1939:  Ideological  and  Strategic  Incompatibility”,  International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, 12, 3, (1980): 351-372.
5 See Bassam Tibi,  Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State (London, 1997); Jacques 
Thobie, Ali et les 40 voleurs. Impérialisme et Moyen-Orient de 1914 à nos jours (Paris, 1985), 15-35; 
Pier Giovanni Donini, Il Mondo Islamico. Breve storia dal Cinquecento a oggi (Rome, 2003), 220.
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country. The Hallstein Doctrine of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) dated back to the first 
fifities and was based on the pretention by the FRG to be the only representative for the whole 
German nation. Such policy advocated diplomatic and financial  boycott  of  those states which 
recognized the GDR and it exploited economic leverage over the Third World to set such political 
conditions on partners6. Both states strategically aligned and coordinated themselves with their 
two superpowers,  but  they  developed a technological  and industrial  capacity  which  provided 
major  opportunities  to  assert  their  own roles  and models  both at  domestic  and international 
levels. Moreover, because of their exclusion from direct military interventions abroad, their foreign 
projections were based on technological and capital transfer as well as on vocational training for 
administrative and political  elites;  and that  was exactly  what many Third  World  leaders were 
asking  for.7 Different  as  they  were,  both  frameworks  matched  with  the  myth  of  Western 
technological  progress  and  rational  efficiency.  Interestingly,  the  two  Germanys  competed 
vigorously in the fields of vocational education and technical training for Syrians: along with many 
Ba’thists, East and West German officials conceived Erziehung zur Arbeit (“training for work” with 
an ethic based on discipline, punctuality and productivity) as crucial to the process by which the 
postcolonial leaders and the third world working class would learn what “modernity” was, and how  
it should work.8
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
had significant roles to play in the Middle East. The FRG exploited the well established German 
interaction with the Arab and Muslim world whereas the GRD stressed its solidarity with national  
liberation movements on the basis of anti-imperialism. Moreover, they both strove for integration 
into  the world-economy,  which  the Arab states were  already part  of.  To  be  sure,  the FRG’s 
international presence was proportional to its economic strengh and productive specialization in 
high  value-added production.  However,  since  the mid-sixties,  the GDR also  planned a great 
economic restructuring that shifted the focus from extensive to intensive growth, which implied a 
deeper integration in the international division of labor. Like Bonn, East-Berlin badly needed raw 
materials and primary commodities, which the Soviets increasingly planned to sell  to western 
6 Sara Lorenzini,  Due Germanie in Africa.  La cooperazione allo sviluppo e la competizione per  i  
mercati di materie prime e tecnologia (Florence, 2003) 61; Glenn W. Gray, Germany’s Cold War. The 
Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969, (Chapel Hill, 2003) 65, 132. See also Heinrich 
End,  Zweimal  Deutsche  Aussenpolitik,  Internationale  Dimensionen  des  innerdeutschen  Konflikts  
1949-1972 (Köln, 1973), 19, 36, 89-110.
7 Politisces  Archiv  des  Auswärtigen  Amts  (PAAA).  B36  IB4  Band  126,  Bericht  nr.  581/64. 
Öffentlichsarbeit  über Entwicklungshilfe,  Damascus,  July 15,  1964, Mangold,;  Sara Lorenzini,  Due 
Germanie in Africa. 43, 97. See also Brigitte H. Schulz Development Policy in the Cold War Era. The  
Two Germanies and Sub-Saharian Africa, 1960-1985. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995; Hans-Joachim 
Spanger, Lothar Brock, Die beiden deutschen Staaten in der Dritten Welt: die Entwicklungspolitik der  
DDR; Herausforderung für die Bundersrepublik Deutschland? (Opladen, 1987).
8 Corinna R. Unger, “Rourkela, ein 'Stahlwerk im Dschungel': Industrialisierung, Modernisierung und 
Entwicklungshilfe  im  Kontext  von  Dekolonisation  und  Kaltem  Krieg  (1950-1970).”  Archiv  für  
Sozialgeschichte 48 (2008); Sandro Mezzadra, La condizione postcoloniale (Verona, 2008), 64, 120. 
See also Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thoughts and Historical Difference 
(Princeton, 2000), Gilbert Rist, Le Développement. Histoire d’une croyance occidentale (Paris, 1996).
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markets.9
2. 1 The model of the Federal Republic of Germany
Both Germanys offered their modernization models as mutually exclusive, and closely connected 
with superpower-camp alignment. The FRG championed the free-market economy as the best 
model to achieve fast and self-sustaining rates of growth, and it spread its technical cooperation 
mainly through state-sponsored private agencies. In many ways,  the FRG challenged the US 
model  of  international  cooperation,  supporting  different  strategies  for  growth  in  the  South: 
agriculture, labor-intensive industries and project-aid should dictate foreign assistance rather than 
ambitious and politically motivated funding; economic rather than political “rationality” should be 
the  basis  for  North-South  cooperation  and credits  should  be  granted  on  the  basis  of  sound 
financial criteria. Such a  laissez-faire  approach stressed the need to improve competition and 
local comparative advantages both in the domestic and international markets by increasing raw 
materials exports, agricultural production, educational empowerment, and small- and medium-
size manufacturing. Integration into the world market would create investment, as well as attract 
financial and technological assistance.10 The FRG stressed the need to reform state institutions 
as  an  efficient  supporter  and  regulator  for  the  free-market  economy  based  on  private 
entrepreneurship. On the whole, Bonn did not show any particular preference for state-building 
models, except for loose parlamentarian institutions. 11
Despite the public rethorics to act only on economic,  “neutral” principles, facts on the  
ground demonstrated how non-economic factors carried great weight, too—factors including the 
GDR’s simultaneous activities in the region. The FRG “contained” its eastern rival’s quest for 
international legitimacy through the so called Hallstein Doctrine: it threatened an increasing range 
of measures for diplomatic and financial boycott to those states which granted recognition to the 
GDR, and it consistently exploited its economic leverage over developing states to implement its 
claims for exclusive representation of “Germany” in the world. Last but not least, its laissez-faire 
approach had to adapt to constraints on the ground, not to mention the steady pressure from both  
private sectors and Western allies to temper its orthodoxy. Actually, since the fifties, Bonn’s policy 
had been rigid in theory but pragmatic in its implementation since the uncertain balance between 
economic and political criteria needed recalibrating with every single case. 12
9 Konzeption,  Langfristige Sicherung des Bezuges von Erdöl durch die Aufnahme erdölgeologischer  
Arbeiten  in  der  Republik  Irak,  March  18,  1969,  Kattner,  Stiftung  Archiv  der  Parteien  und 
Massenorganisation der  DDR (Sapmo-Barchiv)  DL2 Band VA 677;  Enzo  Collotti,  Storia delle due 
Germanie, (Turin, 1968), 915-196.
10 Schmidt  Heide-Irene,  “Pushed  to  the  Front:  The  Foreign  Assistance  Policy  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  
Germany, 1958-1971”. Contemporary European History 4 (2003): 473-508.
11 Bericht nr.688/65,  Regierungserklärung vor dem Syrischen Nationalsrat,  Damascus,  October 25, 
1965, Pfeiffer, PAAA B36 IB4 Band 202.
12 See William G. Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-
1969. (Chapel Hill, 2003).
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2.2 The model of the German Democratic Republic
The GDR boosted its economic and political penetration in the Arab world during the late fifties 
and  mid-sixties:  it  soon  endorsed  the  idelogical  framework  of  the  Non-Capitalist  Road to 
development (NCR) promoted by Moscow after 1961 which should provide a viable model for 
Third World states as well as connect them with East Germany’s fast rates of growth and plans 
for technological specialization.13
The  NCR model  advocated  the  overall  primacy  of  politics  and  was  conceived  as  a 
“roadmap” to independence and socialism for those “progressive” forces of the national liberation 
movements which had seized power. The centralization of the state administrative and coercive 
apparatus would consolidate such progressives’ control over society and challenge “conservative”  
forces.  The latter  must  be  marginalized  because,  according  to  the  NCR model,  their  ties  to 
Western imperialism would thwart social reforms as well as drain national resources away from 
the  countries  in  question.  The state  should  be  strenghtened  to  become the  main  agent  for 
domestic capital accumulation and industrialization; it  was supposed to be the best engine to 
match  the  efficient  use  of  scarce  resources  with  equitable  patterns  of  wealth  redistribution.  
Private entrepreneuship had to survive, but as subordinate to the public sector, rather than a 
driving force for growth. Developing states should first protect domestic industry and only at a 
later stage should they be integrated into the world market: that is, only when their bargaining 
power  would  be  strong  enough to  face  foreign  competition.  The socialist  states  could  grant 
bilateral cooperation through long-term credits, technological transfer and professional training, 
mostly on the basis of “buy-back” and “clearing” agreements: in order to face chronic shortages of  
foreign  hard  currency,  these  forestalled  a  partial  or  total  repayment  in  the  form of  resultant  
products stemming from “complete plants” which had been installed with the related credits.  14 
The GDR was much more bound to the Soviet Union than the FRG was to the United 
States. East Berlin’s international cooperation was in no way an alternative to the Soviet one; 
rather, it  integrated sectors which Moscow did not cover. However, since the GDR leadership 
planned to engage massively in international trade in 1963, the strategic limits proved much more 
compelling: trade was closely linked to the influence of the USSR in the developing states and 
followed  its  political  ups  and  downs;  the  quest  for  diplomatic  recognition  involved  economic 
rewards which put much strain on the GDR’s limited capabilities. Actually, Syria’s trade with the 
GDR was far more connected with the granting of credits, that is financial aid, than was its trade 
13 Pilari Dirk and Wahl Dietrich, “Scientific and Technological Relations: Some Aspects between the 
German Democratic Republic and Developing Countries”.  International  Political  Science Review  3 
(1982): 295-303.
14 William D. Graf,  “The Theory of the Non-Capitalist Road.” in The Soviet Bloc and the Third World, 
Brigitte Schulz and William Hansen eds. (Boulder, 1989), 27-52. Despite hard pressures from the GDR 
to get  paid  in hard currency since 1967,  Syria always succedded in holding on with the  clearing 
system.
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with FRG.15
The first decade of Ba’thist rule over Syria was distinguished by disruptive domestic and regional 
conflicts: the traditional social pluralism translated into political fragmentation and affected the 
Ba’thist  regime  itself,  too.  Domestic  conflicts  hindered  much  of  the  reformist  agenda  of  the 
different ruling factions and eventually shaped the fortunes of the models offered by East and 
West Germany. Although Syrian leadership maintained contacts with both industrial camps on the 
basis of its perceived needs, both Germanys’ levels of influence shifted according to the balance 
of forces inside the country: in fact, every model of development was best suited for, and actually  
targeted different class and social groups; thus, its fortunes were closely tied to the political ups  
and downs of its domestic supporters.
3. The Ba’thist regime in Syria
After political independence in 1946, debates arose in Syria over which patterns of development 
the country should take, as well as which foreign experience could be accounted as a suitable 
reference: most of the political élites still related to Western Europe, whereas the socialist states 
began to champion their  models more assertively since the mid-Fifties.  The emerging radical 
nationalists often lacked knowledge or expertise in economics, but they nevertheless pressed for 
a more equal redistribution of wealth as they increasingly opened their political constituencies to 
rural peasants and industrial workers.16 
The  Ba’th  Party  was  a  nationalist  force  born  in  Syria  in  1947,  which  advocated  the 
territorial  and  political  unity  of  the  Arab  Nation as  the  necessary  condition  to  gain  real 
independence and face the challenges of industrial modernity. Without adhering to marxism and 
often disputing with the Arab Communists, its founding fathers tried to elaborate an original theory 
which would couple liberalism and socialism. 17 During the political struggles of the fifties, the Ba’th  
Party extended its constituencies from students and intellectuals to the rural peasantry: its merger 
with the Arab Socialist Party in 1954 brought the realization that the urban merchants and the big  
absentee landlords harshly opposed any  pan-Arab projects. At the same time, the Ba’th found 
receptive ears in the army, whose rank-and-file and medium rank officers came from the rural  
15 Heinz-Dieter Winter, Konfliktregion Naher und Mitteler Osten (Berlin, 2005), 9-10, 20-22.
16 Hanna Batatu, 1999, 133; Rizkallah Hilane,  Culture et Développement en Syrie et dans les Pays  
retardées (Paris, 1969), 103. See also, Hanna Batatu,  The Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi Revolutions:  
Some Observations on Their Underlying Causes and Social Character  (London, 1984) and Anouar 
Abd al Malek, 1970. For a definition of “radicalism” based on those movements “favoring or effecting 
fundamental changes in current practices, conditions, or institutions”, see Berta Berti, “Radicalismo”, in 
Bobbio, Matteucci, Pasquino, 2004, 791-793. 
17 For a general  overview see John F. Devlin,  The Ba’th Party: A History from its Origins to 1966 
(Stanford, 1976); B. Tibi,  Arab Nationalism, 123-169. Among the founding fathers of the Ba’th Party 
the most prominent were Michel ‘Aflaq and Salah ad Din alBitar.
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provinces.  After  the  failing  experience  of  the  United  Arab  Republic  (1958-1961),  political 
hegemony over the military became the focus of Ba’thist politics. On March 8, 1963, the Party 
seized power in Damascus by means of a military coup. Inner divisions in the regime ran deeply 
over agrarian reform and the role of the state in the economy. Opposed to any agreement with 
the big landlords and the urban merchants, the so called “radical” Ba’thists advocated for the 
rapid expansion of state intervention and the seizure of all their private assets. In fact, since April  
1964, clashes within the main cities, economic boycotts, and political intrigues threatened the 
Ba’thist regime with bankruptcy and reversal. From April 1964 to July 1965, the Ba’thists reacted 
with the nationalization of all the major productive sectors: textile factories, extractive industries 
and foreign trade.18
Facing such staunch opposition, the “radical,” militant Ba’thists took the upper hand in the 
regime:  they  adopted  the  “Socialist  Transformation” program  in  autumn  1965,  expelling  the 
moderate old guard Ba’thists with a coup d’état in February 1966 and soon prepared a new five-
year development plan for 1966-1970 that was far more statist than its predecessor from 1961-
1965. Depicted as the only way to modernize Syria, the program centered on economic planning, 
big  infrastructural  projects  and  the  leading  role  of  the  state  in  fostering  industrialization. 
Economically, agrarian reform functioned to increase production, whose financial surplus would 
have been reinvested in industry; land redistribution, peasant and state cooperatives, chemical 
fertilizers and mechanization were the instruments. Politically, the Ba’thists were determined to 
marginalize the traditional centers of power by mobilizing behind the regime the deprived rural  
masses.19 The so called “radical” Ba’thists rallied around Prime Minister Yusef al Zu’ain, President 
Nour ed Din al Atassi and General Salah al Jadid. 
Without having a consistent program, lacking resources and managerial competence, the 
Ba’thists turned to the socialist states for support, since the Western capitals still held priviliged 
contacts with the Syrian conservative forces.20 Actually, these were structurally linked to Western 
states since they monopolized Syrian trade and exports, and adopted anti-communist rhetoric in 
order  to  delegitimize  the  Ba’th  Party  both  domestically  and  internationally21.  As  far  as  the 
international  policies  were  concerned,  the  Government  held  true  to  the  principles  of  Active 
18 Bericht nr.68/65,  Die finanzielle Lage Syriens, Damascus, May 10, 1965, Pfeiffer, PAAA B36 IB4 
Band  202;  Rapport  1964-1965  sur  l’économie  syrienne,  (Damascus:  Office  Arabe  de  Presse  et 
Documentation OAPD, 1966), 62-78; Syed Aziz alAhsan, “Economic Policy and Class Structure in 
Syria: 1958-1980.”. International Journal of Middle East Studies 16 (1984): 312.
19 Bericht  nr.688/65,  Regierungserklärung  vor  dem  Syrischen  Nationalsrat,  Damascus,  October 
25,1965, Pfeiffer, PAAA B36 IB4 Band 202; Rapport 1963-1964 sur l’économie syrienne (Damascus: 
OAPD, 1965), 102; Jahresbericht 1965, Damascus, Grunert, December 12, 1965, Sapmo-BArchiv, DY 
IV2/20 Band 875.
20 Bericht nr.32/65, Einschätzung über Verstaatlichungsmassnahmen, Damascus, February 18, 1965, Clausnitzer, 
Sapmo-Barchiv,  DL2  Band  VAN  677;  Bericht,  Gespräch  mit  dem  Ministerpräsidenten  Dr.  Al  Zouayen, 
Damascus, November 11, 1965, Sorgenicht, Sapmo-Barchiv, DY IV2/20 Band 874; Pedro Ramet,  The Soviet-
Syrian Relationship since 1955: A Troubled Alliance (Boulder, 1990), 33-37; Bonnie F. Saunders,  The United  
States and Arab Nationalism: The Syrian Case, 1953-1960, 83-94.
21 R.  Hilane, Culture  et  Développement  en  Syrie, 153-183. See  also  Hans-Günter  Lobmeyer, 
Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien (Hamburg, 1995).
The Non-Aligned Movement in the Mediterranean Project
The European Institute, Columbia University
DRAFT Working Paper
Do not cite or quote without author's permission
27
Neutrality. However: 
“Though respecting the principle of neutrality, we consider our right to improve friendship  
with those states and liberation movements which, like us, believe in the national and  
socialist struggle and support us in our effort to liberate Palestine” 22. 
Economic and political partners in the two bipolar camps assumed a cautious stance, fearing the 
notorius fragility of the regime. The “radical” Ba’thists endorsed socialism as the best framework 
for Syria’s modernization and looked to Moscow and East Berlin as the main points of reference 
as  far  as  economic  and  political  organization  were  concerned.  However,  much  of  their 
revolutionary  rhetoric  also  echoed  that  of  the  Chinese,  particularly  in  the  refusal  of  any 
compromise with the “capitalist forces.” The radical Ba’thists advocated a “militant” stand against 
western imperialism and its “local agents”, namely Israel, the Arab monarchies and the region’s 
moderate regimes; tensions occurred even with Egypt and Iraq, since they were accused of not  
being progressive enough.23 The Ba’thists strained relations with major Western powers and their 
Arab allies when they nationalized the extractive industries in December 1964 and won a trial of 
strength Western oil companies over the control of pipelines running through Syrian territory in 
March 1967. 
Meanwhile, the relations among West Germany, Syria and other Arab states were souring 
because of the parallel improvement of friendship and cooperation between Bonn and Tel Aviv, 
which led to the diplomatic rupture between March and May 196524. However, the Ba’thists could 
never totally cease political and economic relations with the capitalist states, nor they wanted: 
western European economies remained their main trade partners and domestic instability in Syria 
forced them to maintain contacts.25 According to the Active Neutrality, the Arabs fully exploited the 
GDR’s quest for diplomatic recognition to extract better conditions for trading, credits and support  
in the struggle against Israel. The GDR was fully aware; already in late 1966, Consul General in  
Damascus,  Horst  Grunert,  had  summarized  the  Syrian  position  to  the  SED  leadership  as 
following: 
22 Oriente Moderno 1965, n.10, 815-818; Devlin 1976, The Ba‘th Party: A History from its Origins to  
1966, p. 222, 224, 227.
23 J. Devlin, The Ba’th Party, 218, 302.
24 Sapmo-Barchiv,  DL2 Band VAN 677,  Bericht  nr.32/65,  Einschätzung über Verstaatlichungsmassnahmen, 
Damascus, February 18, 1965, Clausnitzer; Sapmo-Barchiv, DY IV2/20 Band 874, Bericht,  Gespräch mit dem 
Ministerpräsidenten Dr.  Al  Zouayen,  Damascus,  November  11,  1965,  Sorgenicht;  Ramet,  1990,  33-37.  See, 
Angelika Trimm, “Der Faktor USA in der Entwicklung deutsch-israelischer Beziehungen während des Kalten 
Krieges”, in Wolfgang Schwanitz eds. Deutschland un der Mittlere Osten im Kalten Krieg (Leipzig, 2006), 46-
64; Helmut Hubel eds. Die trilateralen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschalnd, Israel und den USA (Erfurt, 2001); 
Lily  Gardner-Feldman,  the  Special  Relationship  between  West  Germany  and  Israel (Bonn,  1984);  Markus 
Weingardt,  Deutsche Israel- und Nahostpolitik. Die Geschichte einer Gratwanderung seit 1949 (Frankfurt am 
Mainz, 2002). Also, Bonnie F. Saunders, The United States and Arab Nationalism: The Syrian Case, 1953-1960 
(London, 1996), 83-94.
25 Bericht nr.2/69, Technische Hilfe in Syrien, Damascus, January 2, 1969, Schwartze, PAAA B66 IIIB6 Band 
634; see also Etude spéciale sur le Conflit avec l’I.P.C. établi per le Commandement national du Parti Baas  
Arabe Socialiste, (Damascus: OAPD, 1966); and Oriente Moderno, 1-4 (Rome, 1967) 152.
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“I am sorry for the rough expression, but Syrian politicians wish to link their positions on  
the two German states with their bargaining over the Israeli question: say something good  
against Israel and we would do the same for you. Such bargaining is not serious at all; it is  
not politically correct and it does not match with the actual interests of Syria. The real  
problem lies deeper in the underestimation of the class content in the German question.  
(…) but we should let them realize that the very existence of a socialist state on German  
soil, even in just one part of it, already constitutes a relevant progress, which deserves to  
receive support in the context of the struggle against imperialism”, 26.
Under pressure from East-German officials Syria argued that diplomatic recognition was just a 
formal step not  much needed to upgrade their  partnership27.  Despite the gradual  increase in 
political  cooperation with the GDR, Syria granted diplomatic  recognitions only  on the 5 June 
1969. By this time the Hallstein doctrine had already lost its financial deterrence and Brandt's 
Ostpolitk was on the way. As a matter fo fact, Syria granted recognition to the GDR in a move to 
counter  its eastern Iraqi  rival:  the Ba’th  Party in  Baghdad had decided for  GDR’s  diplomatic 
recognition  on  May  5  mainly  to  increase  socialist  camp’s  military,  political  and  economic 
cooperation; locked in regional struggles with Baghdad, Damascus and others members of the 
Arab League soon followed28. Although the SED leadership perfectly realized the price and the 
regional  reasons for  the Arab decisions,  it  rewarded them with  much advantageous  bilateral  
agreements on financial and technical cooperation 29. 
Syria’s military and political defeat by Israel in June 1967 (Nahda) prompted the Ba’thist 
regime to choose between two main strategies to rally public support: on the one hand, to focus 
all the resources on a viable economic development which would provide a material  basis to 
stand up against  aggressions;  on the other hand, to focus primarily on a military build-up to  
counter Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights30. The regime made no clear choice since internal 
factions were too divided to find a common ground. The radicals were challenged by the split  
26 Sapmo-Barchiv, DY30 IVA2/20, 877, Protokoll, Erweiterung der ökonomischen Zusammenarbeit mit  
dem Gastland Syrien, Zk der SED, Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen Berlin, November 26, 1966. 
See also Wippel 1996, 6.
27 SAPMO-Barchiv, DY 30 A2/20 819, Generalkonsulat DDR Bagdad, Gespräch mit Vorsitzenden der Abteilung 
Internationalen Verbindungen der Ba’th Partei, 15 April 1969, Grunert; DY 30 A2/20 871, Sekretariat des Zk der  
Sed, Konzeption für die Verhandlungen mit arabischen Staaten für  die diplomatische Anerkennung, 23 May 
1969;  DL2 1584,  3.AEA, Information,  23 June  1969;  DY 34 7983,  Botschaft  DDR Bagdad,  Gespräch mit 
Vorsitzenden des irakischen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 27 may 1969, Schultze;  AAPD, 1969,  I, 192, Legationsrat 
I.Klasse Schwartze, Damaskus, an Staatssekretär Dückwitz, 7 June 1969.
28 SAPMO-BArchiv,  DY  30  A2/20  871,  Generalkonsulat  DDR  Damaskus,  Gespräch  mit  sowjetischem 
Botschaft,  5 March 1968, Grunert; DY 30 A2/20 819, Generalkonsulat DDR Bagdad, Information, 15 April  
1969, Schultze.
29 MfAA/C  511/73,  MAI,  Dirktionsbereich  Übersee,  Aufzeichnung.  Die  wirtschaftliche  und  technische 
Zusammenarbeit mit Irak, 15 April 1969, Kattner; SAPMO-BArchiv, DY 30 2/20 873, Generalkonsulat DDR 
Damaskus, Bericht.  Die Zusammenarbeit  mit  der  Ba’th Partei,  23 January 1969,  Grunert;  H-D. Winter,  15;  
W.G.Gray, 212-215.
30 The debate over the regime’s priorities was summarized in the phrase  al furat aw al quanityriah? 
That is, “the Dam-project in the Eufrat valley or the recovery of Quneitra” (a major city on the occupied 
Golan Heights)? Bericht,  Über den nationalen Kongress der BathPartei Syriens, September-Oktober  
1968, Damascus, Marter, January 23, 1969, Sapmo-Barchiv, DY IV A2/20 Band 873.
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faction called “nationalist” and led by General Hafiz al Assad; the nationalists criticized the close 
relationship with the socialist states, the full implementation of the Socialist Transformation and 
the “militant” regional policy.31 Al Assad clearly feared Syria’s increasing isolation in Arab politics: 
rhetoric aside, after the  Nahda moderate positions prevailed among Arab League states in the 
Khartoum conferences in August 1967. Amidst  this uncertain environment the struggle in the 
ruling elites led to power dualism (izdiwajiyyat is sultah) and contradictory policies both at the 
economic and foreign levels.32
The final  showdown came in  1970 when the nationalist  Ba’thists  blocked the radicals 
which had embarked Syria on a course of support for the Palestinian guerrillas and had sent 
troops to Jordan during the “Black September.”33 Defence Minister Hafiz al Assad seized power in 
November 1970 by another military coup and gradually built  his hegemony over Syria mainly 
through  reconciliation  between  the  urban  bourgeoisie  and  the  provincial  nationalist  elite. 
Domestically, he forced the Ba’th Party and the related mass organizations to compromise with 
other forces, like the Syrian Communist Party or the conservatives, and to soften their militant 
stand: the latter’s co-optation and the centralization of power in the Presidency were enshrined in 
the National Progressive Front (NPF)  in March 5, 1972 and in the new Constitution adopted 
March  12,  1973.34 The  evaluation  of  the  new  power  structure  differed  much  among  Syrian 
progressive forces: according to its critics, the NPF was the one of the “ institutional structures to  
control Syrian left-wing forces”35; on the contrary, current Syrian communist leaders appreciated 
it, because it offered major opportunities for progressive forces to gain political influence while 
keeping  their  organisational  autonomy.  Quite  interestingly,  the  latter  reported  that  the  GDR 
institutional model was a source of inspiration during the long negotiations which led to the NPF 
and the new Constitution: 
“For sure, we took into consideration foreign experiences, like the GDR one; however,  
most  of  the elements  came out  of  the  Ba‘th  Party  and of  Syrian  Communist  Party’s  
proposals: we might say that theory came from the GDR, whereas practice from Syria” 36.
The state-led development was not abandoned but integrated with more liberty for the private 
31 Member of the  ‘Alawi  confessional minority,  he soon entered the Ba’th Party and used the Army as his 
channel  for  social  and  political  ascendancy.  He  sided  with  the  radical  Ba’thists  beginning  in  1963  but 
increasingly distrusted their domestic and foreign policies for their lack of realism, and focused his attention on 
security issues and national unity. See Patrick Seale Patrick,  Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (London, 
1995); and H. Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, 191-198.
32 George Corm, Le Proche-Orient éclaté, 1956-2006 (Paris, 2006), 238.
33 See Ilan Pappé, A History of Modern Palestine (Cambridge, 2003), 188-196.
34 H.  Batatu,  Syria’s  Peasantry,  206,  244;  Raymond  Hinnebusch,  Syria:  Revolution  from  Above 
(London, 2001), 65-89.
35 Rizq Allāh Hīlān, former Economic Advisor at the Council of Ministers, interview with the author,  
Damascus, Damascus, September 21, 2006; Jamīl Qa   rī, General Secretary of the Committee for 
the Unity of Communists in Syria, interview with the author, Damascus, August 17, 2006.
36 Jacques ‘Abd al Nūr, Syrian Communist Party Secretary in Aleppo, interview with the author, September  
20, 2006; ‘Ammar Bakdāš, General Secretary of the Syrian Communist Party (Bakdāš), interview with the 
author, Damascus, September 6, 2006.
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sectors which agreed to support the regime. Al Assad’s overall policy was labelled the “Corrective 
Movement” and the economic overtures (infitah) mainly concerned trade and agriculture: contrary 
to the previous system, agriculture now received most of the investments of the third five-year 
plan (1971-1976) and centred on the role of the medium land owners as the main agents of  
growth.37 
The Arab-Israeli conflict and inter-Arab competition dictated much of Syrian foreign policy 
in the sixties. However, its irredentist and militant stand led Syria to regional isolation and heavy 
reliance on the global socialist camp. Al Assad struggled to bring Syria back into the center of 
Arab politics: through multilateralism Damascus could profit from the fall of Nasserism and face 
the assertiveness of other competing powers, like Saudi Arabia and Iraq.38 So, al Assad retained 
most of the strategic priorities of the radical Ba’thists, but pursued them with better assessments 
of international politics and unbiased realpolitik.39 Internationally, the Ba’thists systematically used 
political arguments to extract the greatest possible material assistance from both capitalist and 
socialist camps. Syrian geostrategic position in the Middle East was quite a remarkable asset to 
implement the principles and practice of  Active Neutrality: Syria traded with Western European 
markets and received capital from Gulf states, whereas the socialist camp provided arms and aid 
for infrastructure; such a system proved successful after the war of October 1973, when both oil-
rich Arab states and European consumer nations agreed to compromise with Syria. 
It  might  be  worth  mentioning  the  opinions  of  two  former  high  officials  of  Syrian 
Government, Prof. Rizk’allah Hilane and Prof. Issam al Za’im, which summed up the domestic 
and international reason for Syria “to move east”: 
“The conflict with Israel and the rising claims of peasants and the new middle classes built  
the necessary economic and political conditions to move east. In the whole Third World,  
after decolonization, the issues at stake essentially concerned economics: the same Cold  
War, as it developed in the Third World, took the shape of a competition for influence over  
the economic development of the new states and, thus, the patterns along which both  
camps would get access to markets  and raw materials. Economic competition among  
different classes, particularly between peasants, public employees and the rest of society,  
soon translated in ideological competition. Here is how socialism took roots in Syria; and,  
since socialist ideology was controlled by the Soviet Union, here is the reason why Syria  
moved east”40
“It  is  right  to  say that  Israel  was a major  factor  in  disrupting  relations  between Arab  
nationalism and the West. However, it does not account for the whole story, in the sense  
that the political and cultural context of that period was even more important. However,  
according to realpolitik, Syria turned to the East to buy the arms that the West did not  
37 Idem, 116-139. Rapport économique 1971-1972 (Damascus: OAPD, 1972), 351-398. Roger Owen 
and Sevket Pamuk, A History of the Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century (London, 1998), 
152-158.
38 See William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, 2000).
39 P.  Ramet,  The Soviet-Syrian Relationship  since 1955,  87-123.  See also  R.  Hinnebusch,  Syria: 
Revolution from Above, 139-164.
40 R. Hilane, former economic advisor at the Syrian Council of Ministries, interview with the author, 
Damascus, September, 21, 2006.
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want to sell it in the Fifities; moreover, Western capitals played with conspirancies against  
Syrian governments. In the Sixties, Syria moved to the East, because of the influence of  
socialist ideas, which came along with Realpolitk  and the regional balance of forces. In  
the Seventies, Syria related to the East not for ideology but for al Assad’s “machiavellism”:  
he kept a sound distinction between the domestic role of communists and the international  
role of the socialist camp. Actually, the latter was the intermediary and the guarantee for  
national  independence vis-à-vis the diktats of the West in the region.  To sum up, the  
socialist camp and the GDR were very important for Syria for the following reasons: arms  
delivery, mutual profitable business, almost unconditioned political support” 41.
4. The role of the Federal Republic of Germany in Syrian Modernization
The  laissez-faire approach of the FRG faced major difficulties, as it did not fit well with Syrian 
political trends. Both at the domestic and the regional level, Bonn and Damascus entered on a 
collision course, which was to shape their relations for a long time.
The  FRG’s  diplomacy  and  private  industries  traditionally  supported  Syrian  urban 
merchants who were usually allied with conservative religious forces, among them the Muslim 
Brotherhood: in fact, such merchants were West Germany’s main trade partners in Syria, both for 
cotton imports and machinery exports. In 1964, the Ba’thists clashed with private-sector elements 
and curbed their  power through extensive nationalizations.  Moreover,  the institutional  reforms 
adopted by the radical Ba’thists after 1966 purged many ministerial officials who had supported 
the  FRG and  opposed  the  Socialist  Transformation.  On  the  whole,  Bonn  suffered  from the 
political and economic decline of  its local partners and lost relevant  channels of influence on 
Syrian policy-makers.42 
The Arab-Israeli conflict was a major factor in disrupting relations between the Ba’thist 
regime and the FRG. Syrian nationalists directed a huge share of the nation’s resources toward 
countering Israel, whose policies were perceived not only as a military and territorial challenge 
but as a threat to Syrian modernization, too. Beginning in the early sixties, Bonn increased its  
military and financial support for Israel: along with US pressure for more burden sharing, some 
politicians in the FRG often equated the East-West competition with the Arab-Israeli one.43 Egypt, 
Syria and other “progressive” Arab states reacted by linking the regional conflict with the East-
West  German  rivalry  and  upgraded  relations  with  the  GDR.44 Bonn  retaliated  by  granting 
41 Issam al Zaim, former Minister of Industry and Director of the Arab Center for Strategic Studies, interview  
with the author, Damascus, August 14, 2006.
42 Telegramm nr.135/6, Damascus, April 8, 1965, Pfeiffer, PAAA B36 IB4 Band 202; Bericht nr.284/65, 
Gespräch mit Vorsitzenden der Abteilung Europa beim syrischen Auswärtigen Amt, October 23, 1965, 
Pfeiffer, PAAA B36 IB4 Band 203; Bericht nr.196/68, Die Zusammenarbeit mit Syrien, July 22, 1968, 
Pfeiffer, PAAA B66 IIIB6 Band 483.
43 Daniel Gerlach,  Die doppelte Front: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschlands und der Nahostkonflikt, 1967-1973 
(Berlin, 2006), 35-47; FRUS, XV, 1964-1968, Germany and Berlin, Memorandum From the Chairman of the 
Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler),  Germany:  
March 1965, Washington, March 20, 1965. See also, Avi Shlaim,  Il muro di ferro. Israele e il  mondo arabo 
(Bologna, 2003), 228-248.
44 Telegramm nr197/65, June 4, 1965, Pfeiffer, PAAA B36 IB4 Band 202.
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diplomatic recognition to Israel and most of the Arab states broke off relations with the FRG in 
May  1965.  Despite  pressure  from  private  corporations  and  local  diplomats,  the  Federal 
Government of Chancellor Erhard stood firm in the implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine and 
halted most  financial cooperation.45 Such a policy proved to be at  odds with current  regional 
trends and to overestimate the FRG’s economic leverage across Syria. Without governmental 
credits  Damascus could  not  pay  West  German companies  and the latters  were  increasingly 
excluded from the domestic market because of fierce European competition.46. The situation was 
convincigly summed up by the FRG representative in Damascus in spring 1966: 
“After one year since the break-up of diplomatic relations, the Federal Republic is striving  
in a very difficult situation. We are still the main supplier of Syria, but we do not enjoy any  
special and privileged position, particularly after the Soviet Union committed to the first  
stage of construction of the Dam on the Euphrates. Here, we lost the last relevant channel  
which  tied  Syria  to  Germany;  there  is  no  other  relevant  factor  for  the  resumption  of  
political dialogues with Syria. Our aim, now, is not to resume diplomatic relations, rather to  
prevent Syria from recognizing the Soviet Occupied Zone: though, on the ground, their  
relations already amounts to de facto recognition” 47
On the whole, the Western European states still remained Syria’s main trade partners. However, 
for the time being, their share declined relatively because of the financial and political difficulties 
Damascus had to face and because of  the presence of  the socialist  camp as an alternative 
market for low-cost technology purchase. According to the FRG: 
“We must recognize that Syria does not urgently need western economic aid like Jordan:  
this fact prevents us from normalizing our relations any time soon” 48.
Within  this  context,  a  major  blow  to  the  FRG’s  prestige  concerned  one  of  the  biggest 
infrastructural projects ever made in Syria: like the Aswan Dam in Egypt, the case of the dam on 
the Euphrates River was highly politically charged because the project was seen as the symbol of 
a new modern Syria. Exploratory efforts had been made by the Soviets in 1959 but the contract  
45 Gespräch  des  Bundeskanzler  Erhard  mit  dem Syrischen  Botschafter  Khabbaz,  VS-vertraulich, 
February 2, 1965, Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands. München (AAPD), 
(1965) ZA 5-19;  Botschaftsrat I. Klasse Lahn, Kairo, an das Auswärtige Amt,  Betr.: Bewertung des 
Hassouna-Besuches und seine Auswirkungen, VS-Vertraulich, May, 16, 1967, AAPD (1967), ZB 6-1-
12532.
46 Bericht nr.165/65, Die wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit der BRD in Syrien, Damascus, November 29, 1966, 
Schwartze, PAAA B66 IIIB6 Band 253. The main competitors were its European allies, in particular 
Italy  and  France.  Bericht  nr.  732/65,  Rapport  des  Conseillers  et  des  Attachés commerciaux  des  
ambassades de la CEE à Damas, Damascus, November 25, 1965, Pfeiffer, PAAA B34 IB6 Band 459.
47 PA AA B36 IB4 253, Bericht nr. 41/66, Syrien und die Bundesrepublik Deutschlands nach dem Abbruch  
der diplomatischen Beziehungen, SIBRD Damaskus, 09.05.1966, Pfeiffer. Accordingly, the FGR acted on 
the Arab League’s moderate states to prevent Damascus’ efforts for a common Arab stance on the GDR 
recognition; and it was successful, PA AA B36 IB4 253, Erklärung des Ministers Schröder an Vorsitzenden  
des Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Bundestages, Herr H. Kopf, Bonn, 02.06.1966..
48 PA AA B36  IB4  304,  Bericht,  Haltung  Syriens  zu  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschlands,  SIBRD 
Damaskus, 14.11.1967, Schwartze.
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was awarded to the FRG in 1963.49 However, disputes arose over the project’s increasing costs 
and Bonn  doubted  Syrian  financial  solvency.  For  its  part,  Damascus  hoped for  more  loans, 
arguing that as the backers of the dam the FRG could compete with the Soviets and enjoy a 
unique status in the region. Nevertheless, Bonn applied a rigid fiscal standard and tried to use the 
issue to influence Ba’thist economic policy as well as to gain other contracts in the oil sector 50: 
“The Federal Republic of Germany must clarify that it might grant the credit only if Syria  
would review the basis of its economic policies; in short, Syria should regain the path  
towards  stabilization  which  would  favour  market  dynamics  and  led  to  a  free-market  
economy”51
After the diplomatic break-off in May 1965, both capitals exploited the Euphrates project to keep 
contacts open. However, the arrival of the radical wing in the Ba’th Party in February 1966 led  
Syria to award the contract to the Soviet Union.52 After that, the FRG did not participate in any 
major economic projects in Syria, because these required political convergence or engagement at  
the  least,  in  which  neither  side  showed  any  real  interest.  In  late  1968  and  1970,  al  Assad 
attempted to improve contacts but Bonn mainly refused because of diffidence and mistrust of the 
Ba’th regime. Moreover, although the Hallstein Doctrine was actually abandoned by Chancellor 
Brandt,  the  latter  stood  firm  in  order  to  undermine  the  GDR’s  domestic  and  international 
legitimacy before the conclusion of bilateral negotiations in 1972. It was only in 1974, after the 
October Yom Kippur War, that both states fully resumed relations on the basis of realpolitik and 
trade interests.53 
On the whole, the free-market oriented, liberal modernization model of the FRG lost its 
influence on Syria for two main reasons: first and foremost, it did not address the social claims 
and political grievances the Ba’th Party represented; actually, it was best suited to the opposition 
forces.54 Second, the FRG decided to institutionalize its close relationship with Israel just at the 
apex of Arab political radicalization, so that its Syrian supporters were almost guaranteed to be 
marginalized. Its responses to the Arab-Israeli conflict initiated the relative decline of its economic 
and political leverage vis-à-vis the GDR. Eventually, Syria did not turn to socialism, the state 
sector never held a monopoly over the economy and the FRG still enjoyed great technical and 
49 Gemeinsame Kommuniqué BRD und SAR, Bad Godesberg, 16 January 1963, PA AA B36 IB4 Band 54.
50 Bericht nr.23/64, Gespräch mit syrischen Wirtschaftsminister, Damascus, January 17, 1964, Mangold, PAAA 
B66 IIIB6 Band 396; Dawood Hido, former Director at the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade, interview  
with the author, Damascus, 7 July 2006.
51 PA AA B36 IB4 126, Bericht, Neuer Stand-by Kredit, AA III B6 an Botschaft Damaskus, 11.05.1964, 
Pauls
52 Telegramm nr.72/66, Damascus, April 25, 1966, Pfeiffer, PAAA B36 IB4 Band 254.
53 Bericht nr.129/70,  Technische Hilfe für Syrien, Damascus, June 25, 1970, Mirow, PAAA B66 IIIB6 
Band 706. See  also D. Gerlach, Die doppelte Front, 79-82.
54 Issam alZaim, Former Minister of Industry and Chairman of the Planning Commission, interview with 
the author, Damascus, August, 14, 2006. As the British had done in Iraq before 1958, the GDR’s 
projects were perhaps well suited for economic growth but relied overmuch on local partners whose 
power was eroded by social mobility and the political activism of other forces. See Paul W.T Kingston, 
Britain and the Politics of Modernization in the Middle East, 1945-1958 (Cambridge, 1996).
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cultural prestige. Most of the Arab students in the FRG came from Syria and they all belonged to 
the economic and political élites. However, the point is that the FGR lost any political influence 
over Syria and was reduced to the role of trade partner.
5. The Role of the German Democratic Republic in Syrian Modernization
In the sixties the Ba’th regime tried to concentrate power in a new state based on ideology and  
collective party institutions. Though this was prevented by internal factionalism, the Ba’th looked 
for models and experiences abroad and found in the GDR one of its most active partners in state-
building. The GDR supported Syria mainly for political reasons. In the struggle for international 
recognition, the GDR placed much confidence in “progressive” Arab states and Syria played a 
pivotal  role  along with  Egypt,  Iraq and Algeria.55 Moreover,  since 1964,  the GDR planned to 
enhance its economic relations outside the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
among socialist states) mainly to find export markets and hard currency revenues. 
The rise in power of the radical Ba’thists from late 1965 provided the political opportunity 
to  set  up  a  consistent  framework  for  a  closer  partnership  on  the  principles  of  “Proletarian 
Internationalism” and “Anti-imperialist Solidarity”.56 Before 1965, the GDR had hardly any stake in 
Syrian modernization; East Germany could enter the stage only after the radical Ba’thists got rid 
of the private sector and later of their own old guard. However, the Arab defeat in 1967 boosted 
those Syrian forces which were mainly concerned with security issues or  which never wholly 
endorsed the East-German model for development. The influence of the FRG followed the exact 
opposite trajectory.  The GDR’s practical influence depended on the resources available to its 
Syrian partners: after 1967 increasing military expenditures drained financial resources from the 
economic development  plans which should legitimate  “progressive”  forces and provide major 
opportunities for GDR’s investments. Given the June defeat and the diplomatic impasse, Willy 
Stoph, President of the Council of Ministers, made the GDR political line clear in October 1967: to 
keep on supporting Syria but pressuring Damascus to face primarly economic issues rather than 
engaging in “hazardous” military adventures: 
“We should do everything to support Syria in its antimperialist struggle and we should  
prevent it  from being overturned. However, we also must make it clear that they must  
primarly face their economic troubles rather than engage in hazardous military actions” 57.
55 See W. G. Gray,  Germany’s Cold War,  65, 174; H-D. Winter,  Konfliktregion Naher und Mitteler  
Osten, 8-11.
56 Ingrid Muth,  Die DDR-Aussenpolitik,  1949-1972. Inhalte, Strukturen, Mechanismen (Berlin, 2001) 
35-47.
57 Sapmo-Barchiv, DY30 IVA2/20, 874, Vermerk, Über ein Gespräch am 19.10.1967 beim Genossen  
Hermann  Axen  über  die  weitere  Beziehungen  der  DDR  mit  der  SAR,  Zk  der  SED,  Abteilung 
Internationale Verbindungen, October 20, 1967.
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First of all, the GDR contributed to the Ba’thist modernization of the state sector and those central 
institutions best suited for economic and social planning. East Germany sent several advisors 
both at technical and ministerial levels and most of their suggestions were translated into law; 
these  included the enhancement  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  the  establishment  of  the  State 
Planning Commission, the Central Statistic Bureau, the improvement of the Ministry of Finance, 
as well as those of Industry and Economy.58 The GDR also had an influence on the reform of the 
local administrative institutions, which had been actually independent from any central control:  
the  new law tried  to  enforce  a top-down decision-making  structure  which  left  provincial  and 
communal  authorities  with  few  legislative  powers:  moreover,  though  it  enforced  elective 
institutions  at  the  local  level,  it  also  favoured  Ba’th  Party  control  because  the  latter  held 
responsibility to appoint the executive officials.59 All such efforts were aimed at consolidating and 
centralizing state power and setting up a more consistent framework for state interventions both 
in the economy and in social services. One peculiar feature of the GDR presence in Syria was the  
dispatching of the so called Regierungsberater (Government Advisors): a group of advisors which 
worked to reform the central government in Damascus. Already in 1965, the Vice-President of the 
Council  of  Ministers,  Gerhard  Weiss,  reccommended  the  Consul  General  of  the  GDR  in 
Damascus to handle the activities of the Regierungsberater with extreme caution and prudency: 
“The activities should have a consultancy feature and the advisors should not assume any  
state  executive  function.  (…)  In  order  to  let  them elaborate  their  own  proposals,  the  
comrades should act as advisors and they will influence their Syrian partners through the  
representation of the development path of our country (…) We might show our positive as  
well as negative experiences, so that they could work out the suitable solution for the  
current stage of development in Syria. (…) The structure as well as the division of labor of  
the different Ministries can be handed over but with the explicit mention that they fulfil the  
specific development of our state and the state of the GDR economy. The Syrian requests  
for proposals for their state-building should not be accepted. Once they get explained the  
working methods of our Institutions, it is up the Syrians to elaborate the most suitable for  
them. When the Syrian partners submit their proposals, comrades could make comments  
on them. On Syrian legislative drafts,  comrades could take a position only  orally  and  
always in connection with the GDR experience; whereas, advice should be handed over  
only as personal opinion”60.
Interestingly enough, the GDR’s contribution was welcomed by all different factions inside the 
Ba’thist  regime  and  by  non-marxist  Syrian  economists  and  politicians,  too.  To  be  exact, 
58 Bericht nr.239/72, Die Tätigkeit der Berater der DDR in der SAR 1968-1972, Damascus, October 4, 1972, 
Konschel, MfAA/B Band 1.208/75. Since March 1966, all nationalized industries were set up in 4 different  
branches, along the Vereinigungen Nationalisierter Betriebe of the GDR, VV.AA, Etudes sur le Secteur Public  
Industriel en République Arabe Syrienne (Damas, OAPD, 1970), 10-12.
59 OAPD, Les principes de base du projet de loi sur l’administration locale. Texte intégral, Juin 1968, 
Damas; Bericht nr. 285/68,  Lokale Selbstverwaltung, Damaskus, June 24, 1968, Schwartze, PAAA 
B36 IB4 Band 304.
60 Sapmo-Barchiv, DY30 IVA2/20 874, Kurzprotokoll,  Über eine Beratung beim Genossen Dr. Weiss  
am 30.12.1965, MfAA, Abteilung Arabische Staaten an Stellv. des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der 
DDR,  Dr.  G.  Weiss,  Mitteiler:  GK  der  DDR  in  der  SAR,  Generalkonsul  Grunert  und  Genossen 
Sorgenicht, December 31, 1965. 
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enhancement of central state power was a common feature for the modernizing theories of both 
camps in the fifties and sixties.61 
According to most Syrian observers, the GDR offered valuable assistance in vocational 
training. Most students and middle-rank state officials who had rural origins could not afford to 
study and train in Western Europe. The socialist camp, and the GDR especially, provided them 
with the opportunity to enhance their knowledge and to upgrade their social and economic status 
while remaining in Syria or once they got back from East-Germany. Inevitably, their training easily 
got  outdated,  but  one  should  not  overestimate  the  country’s  capacity  to  absorb  the  most 
advanced  technology,  too:  without  proper  labor  training  and  a  suitable  social  environment 
technology transfer could well turn into disaster and eventually increase external dependence. As 
for the GDR, despite high expectations vocational training did not necessarily provide East-Berlin  
with privileged economic assets because the Syrians still banked on international competition to 
secure better assistance. 62
The GDR’s aid in improving Syrian infrastructure also has been generally regarded as 
effective as far as value-for-money was concerned. Syria never had the financial resources to buy  
all  the products it  needed from the FRG and Western European markets. The GDR supplied 
medium-level technology at low costs and helped Syria to overcome its chronic hard-currency 
deficits, thanks to favorable long-term credits.63 Here, too, political partnership played a major role 
in economics: the GDR granted a twenty-five-million dollar credit in October 1965 and a fifty-
million  dollar  one  in  June  1969  when  Damascus  upgraded  and  eventually  recognized  the 
diplomatic status of East German representatives.64  A major criticism is that both the GDR and 
Syria became “captive” markets for their respective products and never really stimulated better 
standards of quality and technological upgrading.65 In this regard, the GDR  Regierungsberater 
61 The GDR also cooperated with the Syrian security services as contribution to the strengthening of 
state-power  (Staatsmacht),  see  Konzeption,  Die  Zusammenarbeit  beim  Staatsapparat,  Damascus 
May 30, 1970, Sapmo-Barchiv, DY 30 IV A2/20 Band 874. For the activities of the GDR advisors in 
Syrian Ministries, see Hauptgruppe nr. 6 MfAA Bände A-13676, B-1.191/75, B-1.207/75, B-1.208/75, 
B-1.210/75, B-1.211/75, B-1.213/75, B.1.212/75, B-1.214/75, B-1.215/75, B-1.216/75, B-1.217/75, B-
1.218/75. See also VV.AA.  Etudes sur le secteur Public Industriel en République Arabe Syrienne, 
(Damascus:  OAPD,  1970);  VV.AA.  La Planification  Economique  et  Sociale  en  R.A.S.  1960-1970  
(Damascus: OAPD, 1971); Michel Seurat, “Etat et industrialisation dans l’Orient Arabe: les fondements 
socio-historiques”, in VV.AA. Industrialisation et changements sociaux dans l’Orient arabe.
62 See R. Hilane,  Culture et Développement en Syrie,  113-241; and Antoine  Zahlan,  Science and 
Science Policy in the Arab World (New York, 1980). D. Hido, interview with the author, Damascus, 12 
June 2006. Some critics accused the GDR for having exported low labor productivity. Actually, several 
GDR experts repeatedy brought the issue to the attention of Syria authorities. See MfAA references at 
note n. 51.
63 For GDR-Syrian Agreement  on Scientific  and Technical  Cooperation,  see SAPMO-Barchiv,  DL2 
VA7338, Protokolle, Vereinbarungen und Abkommen zwichen DDR und SAR, 1965-1988; Rapport sur 
l’économie syrienne 1967-1968, (Damascus: OAPD, 1968), 25-36;  Rapport sur l’économie syrienne  
1969-1970 (Damascus: OAPD, 1971), 27-38.
64 Abkommen für die Wirtschaftliche und Technische Zusammenarbeit, October 17, 1965, Sapmo-Barchiv, DL2 
Band VA7338; Abkommen für die Wirtschaftliche und Technische Zusammenarbeit, July 23, 1969, und Protokoll  
am WTZ Abkommen von 1965, February 11, 1967, in Sapmo-Barchiv, DL2 Band 367.
65 D. Hido, interview with the author, Damascus, 22 august 2006; Issam al Zaim, former Minister of 
Industry, interview with the author, Damascus, 17 June 2005. According to these interviewees, the 
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would play a central role, as trade attaché, Gerlach, had already suggested in 1968: 
“In the future, the appointment of scientific and technical experts should be structured in  
such a way to influence the investment projects which are compatible with our export  
capacities. That would let them elaborate everything necessary for our deliveries and, in  
case we should succeed with  a tender  bid,  it  should cooperate with the Commission  
appointed to evaluate the projects. (…) In such a perspective the effective and long-term  
presence  of  the  economic,  scientific  and  technical  experts  in  influent  positions  must  
significantly  contribute  to  the  development  of  both  Syrian  national  economy  and  the  
international economy of the GDR, in the sense of providing a sound market position” 66.
Actually, diplomatic recognition in 1969 marked a shift toward  Realpolitik in GDR policy toward 
Syria: in fact, at economic level, Berlin tried to adapt bilateral relations to international standards 
and apply more sound financial rationality 67: 
“Since the end of the Sixties we urgently need to sell our products in exchange for hard  
currency: this was required to import other goods from foreign markets, particularly oil  
from Algeria and Iraq, and technology from Western Europe. Beside this, there were also  
other  reasons  to  abandon  the  clearing  system:  ther  textiles  we  imported  from Syria  
suffered from low-quality; the same was true for the wine we imported from Algeria in  
exchange for our industrial plant; actually, nobody liked them 68.
Despite much efforts, East-Germany was not successful in extracting profits from Syria, because 
financial  rewards for diplomatic recognition still  let Syrians enjoy very favourable conditions69. 
According to Dawd Hido, former student in the GDR and Director at the Department of Foreign 
Trade of the Ministry of Economy: 
“The GDR planned to restructure its international economic relations. However, Syria was  
always an exception:  until  the very end,  we gained favourable conditions for  clearing,  
long-term credits and exemption from monetary transactions” 70.
Last but not least, the GDR provided the Ba’thist regime with the institutional framework to exert  
its leading role. The Ba’th Party was determined to attain hegemony over all of the country and 
compel  other  forces  to  recognize  its  political  preeminence.  Vice-Secretary  of  the  National 
responsibility belonged to both countries’ ruling élites, who never pressed for closer cooperation in 
technological and envirornmental upgrading.
66 Sapmo-Barchiv, DL2 VAN 1586, Vorstellung des HV für den WTZ-Abkommen und den Einsatz der  
Berater, HV der DDR in der SAR, an MAW, Direktionsbereich Übersee I, May 25, 1968, Gerlach.
67 Wippel 1996, 4, 12-13, 24.
68 H.  Monsees,  former  GDR trade-attaché  in  Syria,  1979-1985,  interview with  the  author,  Berlin, 
January 15, 2006.
69 H. Monsees, former GDR Trade-attaché in Syria, 1979-1985, interview with the author, Berlin, January 
15, 2006. Klaus Gädt, former GDR Trade-attaché in Iraq, 1974-1981, expressed similar opinions, interview 
with the author, Berlin, January 18, 2006.
70 D.    īdū, former Director of the Foreign Trade Department and President of the Department for 
Energy  at  the  Ministery  of  Economy  and  Foreign  Trade;  member  of  the  Politbüro  of  the  Syrian 
Communist Party (Faī  al), interview with the author, Damascus, June 7, 2006.
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Command of the Ba’th Party, Abd’allah al Ahmar reminded that: 
“The main reasons for our cooperation with the SED were the latter’s progressive and  
socialist  features,  its  support  for  the liberation of  our  lands and last  but  not  least  its  
experience in the management and organisation of the whole different social components  
of the country. (…) the SED and the socialist camp ha d a major advantage: the Party was  
present in every sector and social segment: they know how to deal with every sector and  
different interests, and this thanks to the Party organisation. (…) However, we never copy 
any model: we selected some features of other experiences, like the party organisation,  
the intelligence services and so on”71
In the sixties, the Party still had a narrow political base and had to rely more on coercion rather 
than consensus. It asked East Germany for help in building effective organizations which would 
mobilize its constituencies:  the  Sozialistiche Einheitspartei  Deutschlands (SED) was eager to 
provide its institutional experience. From late 1966 on, the Ba’th Party developed close contacts 
and official exchanges with the SED, and the same connnections occurred among the various 
Syrian Trade Unions and their East-German counterparts.72 Such a relationship was approved 
with some ambivalence by the Syrian Communist Party (SCP), which had a long record of close  
cooperation with the SED: on the one hand, the socialist states effectively supported the SCP 
during negotiations with the Ba’thists and the establishment of the National Progressive Front, 
and the same was true in times of crisis and repression; on the other hand, the SCP feared 
marginalization  because  of  the  privileged  relations  between  the  two  ruling Parties.73 In  the 
bilateral meetings, the SED exposed its organizational structures and in particular how the ruling 
party  managed  its  relations  with  junior partners  in  the  NPF;  the  same  topics  concerned 
discussions  about  the  balance  of  forces  inside  the  different  Trade  Unions,  professional 
organizations, factories and public administrations. The SCP focused its attention on how popular 
organizations could contribute to Syria’s modernization, whereas the Ba’th concentrated more on 
the political control of such organizations: that is, how to turn them into front organizations, which 
would promulgate the regime’s policies without major dissent. Despite its efforts at hegemony or 
even political monopoly, the Ba’th Party had never been able to transcend the political pluralism 
and fragmentation that characterized Syrian politics. On the whole, the highly centralized Leninist  
model for mass mobilization had the historical merit to engage Syrian peasantry and youth into 
71  Interview with the author, Damascus, August, 17, 2006.
72 For the exchange of delegations between the SED and the Syrian Ba’th Party, see Sapmo-Barchiv,  
Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen, DY 30 A2/20 Bände 381, 871-876. For the relations between 
the respective Trade Unions, see Abteilung Internationale Verbindung der FDGB, Sapmo-Barchiv, DY 
34 Bände 4173, 7959, 7963, 7965, 7974, 7976, 7983, 14028, 14194, 14195. For the relations among 
the GDR and Syrian Youth organizations, see Sapmo-Barchiv, Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen 
der FDJ, DY 24 Bände 6.829, 10.440, 10.447, 10.450; Abdallah al Ahmar, Assistant Secretary of the 
Ba’th  Party  National  Command,  interview with  the author,  Damascus,  17 August  2006;  Raymond 
Hinnebusch, “Political Recruitment and Socialization in Syria: The Case of the Revolutionary Youth 
Federation”,  International Journal of the Middle East Studies  2 (1980): 143-174;  Galia Golan, “The 
Vanguard Party.” Soviet Studies 4 (1987): 599-609.
73 For the relations between the SED and the SCP, see Sapmo-BArchiv, DY 30 A2/20 Bände 332, 371, 
868-87.
The Non-Aligned Movement in the Mediterranean Project
The European Institute, Columbia University
DRAFT Working Paper
Do not cite or quote without author's permission
27
politics. The question lay in the controversial nature of such a mode:. on the one hand, the more  
the Ba’th regime used popular activism to fight against the traditional ruling élites or external 
threats, the more its constituencies prevented the dilution of its radical ideology and egalitarian 
policies; on the other hand, mass incorporation in an authoritarian regime never allowed fully  
inclusive participation.74 
These aspects  combined with regional  instability  and the long-term effect  of the June 
1967 defeat, which marked the end of the political hegemony of secular, nationalist forces in the 
Middle  East,  and  eased  the  recovery  of  moderate  and  conservative  ones.  Despite  initial  
opposition, both the SED and the SCP supported the “realist” Hafiz al Assad and his national 
reconciliation policy: they all converged on the priority of regime consolidation and legitimation.75 
The socialist states continued to support Syria not so much as a country on the so-called road to 
socialism  but  rather  more  realistically  as  a  “modernizing,  progressive”  and  “anti-imperialist” 
regime.76 This was true for Heinz-Dieter Winter,  former GDR Ambassador in Syria and senior 
official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
“The relations between the GDR and Syria were a “marriage of convenience” for both  
countries: the socialist camp was an obliging and necessary ally against Israel, but the  
Ba’th Party did not want to become a “natural” ally of the East against the capitalist West:  
actually, there was no common ideological base between the SED and the Ba’th Party  
(…). Especially after 1973, we realized that there was’nt any chance that Syria would turn  
into a socialist state or would even follow the Non-capitalist Road to Development. The  
parasitic and bureaucratic bourgeoisie had already consolidated 77.
Far  from introducing  any  major  element  of  its  own brand of  socialism,  the GDR contributed 
toward reforming and rationalizing some of  Syrian central  state institutions:  the expansion of  
social services and economic activities required a much more complex administrative apparatus 
than the one inherited by the Ottoman empire or the French Mandate78. As a result, despite all 
rethoric and wishful thinkings, the GDR and its advisors contributed toward setting Syria in line 
with contemporary trends in international development and state-building; that is, a strong central  
state which could intervene extensively in economy and society in order to warrant a high degree 
of capital accumulation, social development and political stability79. One could, arguably, wonder 
74 See Mahmud Hussein,  Versant Sud de la liberté (Paris, 1993);  R. Hinnebusch,  Syria: Revolution 
from Above, 2-13.
75 However, domestic political tensions and dissent exploded whenever the Ba’thist regime faced a 
major external crisis. See, e.g. Telegramm nr.168/73, October 21, 1973, Konschel, MfAA/C 1388/75.  
See also A. G. Samarbakhsh, Socialisme en Irak et en Syrie (Paris, 1978), 143, 174.
76 Information nr.14/73, Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen, Berlin, February 28, 1973, Markowsky, Sapmo-
Barchiv, DY 30 IV B2/20 Band 86.
77 H-D. Winter, former GDR Ambassador in Syria, 1976-1981, interview with the author, January 28, 
2006. Much the same was expressed by W. Konschel, former GDR Ambassador in Syria, 1971-1978,  
interview with the author, Berlin, January 25, 2006.
78 See Nadine Méouchy eds. France, Syrie et Liban, 1918-1946. Les ambiguïtés et les dynamiques de  
la relation mandataire, (Damascus, 2002).
79 As far as the international and economic role of the nation-state, see Ayubi, 1996; Berger, 2004; Tibi, 
1997.
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whether a strong central state could effectively establish itself over a highly plural and fragmented 
society, such as the Syrian one. Nevertheless, for the time being, state and party institutions 
offered quite opportunities to improve social mobility,  and challenged both traditional identities 
and  power  structures.  For  sure,  such  institutional  framework  suffered  from high  inefficiency, 
bankruptcy  and  hard  resistance  to  any  reform  or  improvement.  However,  like  many  other 
institutional systems, it did not prevent social and political change to occur.
6. Modernization according to the Syrian Ba’thists.
The Syrian Ba’th Party has always been highly fragmented and such divisions have translated 
into  different  visions  of,  and projects  to  achieve,  modernization.  However,  state-building  and 
industrial growth were the core features of their efforts, whereas the centralization of power and 
the priority attached to political rationality were  their major strategies.
The nation-state was considered as the necessary and appropriate framework for modernization. 
In their search for Arab unity, the irrendentist Ba’th Party rejected the post-Ottoman geopolitical 
order but actually accepted most of the nation-state institutions as they got established in the 
1920s. Since their rise to power in Damascus, the Ba’thists faced major political obstacles and 
their reformist agenda forced them to focus all efforts on Syria. Particularly after 1967, unitary or 
revolutionary  pan-Arabism  moved  to  intergovernmental  pan-Arabism,  based  on  the  mutual 
respect  of  sovereignty.80 Both  the  Ba’th  Party  and  other  nationalist  forces  considered  the 
centralization of power and decision-making processes as best suited to enforce nation-building 
and accelerated growth. Actually, they considered state-power centralization as a major feature of 
modernity itself, so that, more often than not, “nation-building” was merely meant to be “state-
building”.81 Domestically,  the Ba’th Party was building its constituencies from peasants,  urban 
workers, low- and middle-rank public employees and the military. State-building was to establish 
new institutions which would promote social mobility for those individuals and groups previously 
marginalized82.  In  order  to  address  the  legitimate  claims  of  its  constituencies,  the  Ba’thists 
planned to reform the state apparatus to assume new responsibilities over the economy and 
social services; in parallel, the extension of Party structures and the related mass organisations 
80 Idem, 147, 164-173.
81 R. Owen,  State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Middle East, 28-29. See also Nazih N. 
Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State (London, 2006).
82 See Michel ‘Aflak, “L’Idéologie du Parti Socialiste de la Resurrection Arabe.”  Orient 35 (1965): 147-166. 
However, all factions resorted to traditional and religious communities for support in time of crisis; see Nikolaus 
Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria. Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba’th Party (London, 1996).
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would have granted popular support to the regime’s policies 83. 
It  may be worth mentioning what President  of  the Council  of  Minister,  the “radical”  al 
Z’ayyn said to his GDR partner in October 1965: according to him, Syria still suffered from the 
heritage of the Turkish dominance and French colonialism; the state structure had not changed 
since 1946 and all attempts to reform it just vanished or never achieved any continuity; activity in 
the Ministries still depended on individual senior officials, who usually banked on clientelism and 
personal friendship; the very same educational system did not provide any competence except 
for  lawyers,  and  the  few cadres  they  had  were  often  appointed  in  roles  not  suited  to  their  
competence. For the new Syrian Prime Minister, “the whole system of state building and the state  
top-down decision-making process” should be the main pillar of national reform: that implied the 
expansion of state power and control over society “as the main instrument for socialist building”; 
the functional training of cadres to the new state institutions; the reform of local autonomies and 
the related institutions;  a  new definition of  the relationship between the Party  and the state.  
Eventually,  he  related  to  referred  to  the  German  Democratic  Republic  as  a  useful  point  of  
reference, thanks to its own experience and competence: 
“I kindly ask you to introduce your experience into the heads of Syrian people, so that  
they know exactly where they are heading for as soon as  you leave” 84.
Far  from the depoliticized  technocracy of  many capitalist  models,  in  Syria  all  debates  about 
reforms were conceived and publicized as political  acts,  resulting from domestic  and foreign 
struggles. In fact, institutional reforms mainly occurred when the Ba’th decided to curb its rivals’  
resouces.  During  the  massive  nationalizations  in  1964-1965,  the  Ba’th  was  still  open  to 
compromise as soon as the opposition forces agreed to recognize the regime; and this was true 
for foreign assets, too. Once these refused, the radical Ba’thists enshrined the measures in the 
long-term reform programme of  the  Socialist  Transformation.  Later on,  al  Assad defeated his 
internal rivals and stroke a compromise with the private sector through economic liberalizations in 
1971 and 1974; and he legitimated his coup d’état by establishing the NPF and coopting the 
“moderate” left wing forces.85 In short, since then economic and institutional reforms have always 
been considered by the Ba’thist leaderships functional and subordinated to the imperatives of 
regime-security. 
State-building was thus conceived as a political  act  in  the struggle for power  against 
conservative opposition as well as the main tool to overturn the traditional centers of power, like  
83 See also R. Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, 89-125.
84 Sapmo-Barchiv,  DY30  IVA2/20,  874,  Niederschrift  Nr.  2,  Gespräch  mit  dem Ministerpräsidenten  Dr.  
Yūsuf  al  Z‘ayyin, GK der  DDR in  der  SAR an  ZK  der  SED,  Abteilung  Internationale  Verbindungen, 
November 25, 1965, Sorgenicht.
85 Bericht nr.329/70,  Die neue Regierung Syriens, Damascus, December 12, 1970, Marter, Sapmo-
Barchiv, DY IV2/20 Band 876; Telegramm nr.246/70, Damascus, December 11, 1970, Mirow, PAAA 
B36 IB4 Band 486; Bericht nr.6/65,  Dekrete über die Verstaatlichung in Syrien, Damascus, January 
17, 1965, Clausnitzer, Sapmo-Barchiv, DY IVA2/20 
The Non-Aligned Movement in the Mediterranean Project
The European Institute, Columbia University
DRAFT Working Paper
Do not cite or quote without author's permission
27
the souq or confessional authorities86 : if religious faith in itself was respected, the Ba’th officially 
opposed  any  interference  of  confessional  institutions  in  politics  and  effectively  consolidated 
secularism in Syria87. Actually, in the Sixties the Ba’th was still far from being a mass organization 
and suffered competition from the communists, the conservatives and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Resulting from harsh political struggles, state-building and power-centralization assumed a clear 
defensive feature which, in turn, increased the importance of security concerns and the related 
exprenditures for coercive institutions.
Economic  modernization  was  mostly  equated  with  industrial  growth  in  the  Ba’thists’  eyes. 
Agriculture was often seen as an auxiliary to capital accumulation which would be reinvested in 
industrial projects. On the whole, the Ba’th favoured the integration of agriculture into the overall  
scheme of industrial development, through the extensive use of chemicals and mechanization, 
and, even more important through expansions of infrastructure like the Euphrates Dam.88 After 
1965, the state controlled most industrial activity and became the main agent of its rationalization 
and diversification, and the Ba’th focused first on infrastrucural development in order to boost 
later industrial production. However, boycott or mistrust from the private sector, lack of funds, and 
mismanagement often led to failures in the heavy industry sector, so that the regime later directed  
most investments toward agricultural production and to light and transformation industries. Since 
the state was the main agent for industrialization, the Ba’thists saw planning as the best strategy 
to rationalize its engagement. Prof. Issam al Zaim stressed the relevance of the central planning 
model for development as a reason for the socialist bloc breakthrough into the Third World: 
“Since the Fifties, there were many politicians and state officials which were interested in  
the  introduction  of  a  central  planning  economy:  actually,  what  they  aspired  to  was a  
systematic  and  precise  planning  of  economic  growth.  In  those  years,  there  was  the  
consciousness and  real  belief  in  the capacities  of  the planning model  offered  by  the  
Soviet  Union  (…).  Many  developing  states  accepted  to  establish  relations  with  the  
socialist  states  and  welcome  their  influence  more  to  organize  their  productive  and  
planning forces rather than political of ideological allegiance in socialism” 89 
86 Bericht nr.89/68,  Internes Materiel des Generalkonsulats, Grunert, Damascus, October 10, 1968, 
Sapmo-Barchiv,  DY IV2/20 Band 876; Bericht  nr.285/68,  Die Lokale Selbstverwaltung,  Schwartze, 
Damascus, June 24, 1968, PAAA B36 IB4 Band 304; Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the  
Making of the Middle East (New York, 2004), 10, 28, 178.
87 See Michel ‘Aflak, “L’Idéologie du Parti Socialiste de la Resurrection Arabe.”  Orient 35 (1965): 147-166. 
However, all factions resorted to traditional and religious communities for support in time of crisis; see Nikolaus 
Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria. Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba’th Party (London, 1996).
88 Situated in north-central Syria, the dam and the related hydroelectric station were built between 
1968 and 1977 by the Soviet Union and supplied irrigation water and electricity for central and north-
east developing areas,s ee  Abschlussbericht, Damascus, 12 October 1972, Griesbach, Ministerium 
für  Auswärtigen  Angelegenheiten (MfAA)  B1212/75;  Samir  Amin,  Irak  et  Syrie,  1960-1980 (Paris, 
1982), 13-43. O. Amiralay, Film essai sur la vallée de l’Euphrate, Damascus, Syrian Arab Television, 
1971; VV.AA. Les principales réalisations économiques syriennes (Damascus: OAPD, 1974).
89 Issam al Zaim, former Minister of Industry and Director of the Arab Center for Strategic Studies, 
interview with the author, Damascus, June 26, 2006.
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However, under the Socialist Transformation programme and the GDR’s advisement, the Syrians 
limited planning to public investments without enforcing it on the productive processes. In this 
sense, Syria was not much different from its “capitalist” neighbour Jordan: the latter, too, had 
comprehensive plans for investments in the expanding public sector and infrastructure and used 
planning  as  a  loose  coordination  strategy  among  economic  sectors,  which  were  considered 
“strategic” for a viable market economy.90 In Syria, this approach was to be complemented by the 
urbanization of the rural workforce: the massive entry of peasants into the sector of salaried work 
was conceived as necessary to increase both industrial production and cash transactions. 
Every process of change was to face obstacles and resistance which could be overcome with the 
support of a broad national consensus over reforms: this involved a process of political and social 
legitimization of the ruling élite according to the theory and practice of hegemony91. However, the 
Ba’th  Party  did  not  enjoy  yet  the  national  consensus  it  was  required:  opposition,  resilience, 
contempt ran high all over Syria these and were dealt mainly with coercion. Though the Syrian 
Communist Party was still in competition with the Ba‘thists and its allegations could be somehow 
biased, its leader Khālid Bakdāš told his German partners about the overall approach to labour 
forces of President Z‘ayyin: 
“President Yūsuf Z‘ayyin would believe that he could get rid of the labour class and the  
Syrian Communists from one day to another, just like “you draw from a man his sick blood  
and inject him with the new”, 92.
Moreover, though the Ba’thist  partners often claimed the contrary,  they both endorsed a top-
down, authoritarian approach to development and structural change. Their theories and practices 
actually favoured mass mobilization rather than popular partecipation of the classes they claimed 
to represent: namely, labour forces, peasants, intellectuals and state employees. As a matter of 
fact, they were much more concerned with appointing their loyals to top and senior positions in 
ministries, enterprises, cooperatives and unions, rather than profiting from people’s expertise and 
competence. This fitted well, and probably was necessary too, with the ongoing political struggle 
for state-power but, as the two Germanys reported, it was done often at the expenses of workers 
90 François  Rivier,  “Rente  pétrolière  et  politiques  industrielles  des  Etats  non  pétroliers:  Egypte,  
Jordanie, Liban, Syrie.” in Industrialisation et changements sociaux dans l’Orient arabe (Beirut, 1982), 
69-143: Jahresanalyse 1970, Damascus, January 28, 1971, Gerlach, Sapmo-Barchiv, DL2, Band VA 
1225.
91 For the concept of hegemony I mainly refer to the works of Antonio Gramsci, that is the capacity of  
the ruling class to exert power by both dominion and consent, and to establish its own values and 
interests as “universal”,  here meaning “national”.  For an introduction,  see S. Belligni,  “Egemonia”,  
Dizionario di Politica (Torino,  2004),  302-303; A. Gramsci,  Quaderni  dal  carcere  (Torino, 1975);  L. 
Gruppi, Il concetto di egemonia in Gramsci (Roma, 1972) and C. Buci-Glicksmann, Gramsci e lo Stato 
(Roma, 1975).
92 Sapmo-Barchiv, DY30, IVA2/20, 871, Bericht nr. 23/67, Gespräch mit Genossen K. Bakhdash und  
Einladung zur Parteitag der SED, GK der DDR in der SAR an ZK der SED, Abteilung Internationale 
Verb.indungen, February 6, 1967.
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and peasants, so that these were prevented from participating actively and pledging their hopes 
and  allegiance  to  the  regime.  GDR  Regierungsberater  at  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Heid, 
reported  that  one  major  problem  concerned  the  difficulties  encountered  by  peasants’ 
cooperatives:  as far  as the few existing ones were concerned,  Heid criticized their  rigid  and 
vertical structure which prevented any real participation and engagement of peasants:
“The disadvantage of such an exclusive top-down development of cooperatives is the fact  
that  peasants  behave  passively  in  regard  to  the  cooperative;  there  are  almost  no  
competent  managing  directors  and  the  peasants  do  not  ask  to  have  a  stake  in  the  
direction of the cooperatives; state assistant supervisors replace the management” 93.
The lack of direct popular control over those institutions supposed to run the country left people 
exposed to the risks and sufferings that industrialization and modernization implied. However, far 
from being exclusive to Ba’thism or GDR-style marxism-leninism, these features were common to 
most “modernization” theories and practices in contemporary history 94.
7. Conclusions
As the bipolar competition entered decolonization processes, both camps adapted to the major 
challenges the new states had to face: political independence and economic development. They 
offered their  own models  for  modernization  as  alternative and closely  connected with  camp-
choice. Syria, however, rejected these assumptions and maintained contacts with both industrial  
camps on the basis of  their  perceived needs.  “Tough”  and selective Arab negotiators  proved 
successful forcing bipolar champions to their demands, so that much of the Cold War rethoric of 
both sides was actually neutralized. Here is an example of how Active Neutrality could work on 
the ground. For the time being, regional dynamics seemed to contain and to balance the bipolar 
ones,  forcing the two camps to  commit  into  local  politics  if  they wanted to  preserve  or  gain 
influence. Bending to local  politics offered major bargaining room and resources for the Arab 
élites as far as both camps coud sustain the costs and burdens of massive foreign interventions.  
Inability to realize the independent dynamics affecting the South could lead to disaster in terms of 
political  intervention and financial  expenditure.  The point  was quite  obvious  for  the two Arab 
states,  but less for the GDR and the FRG which had to adapt to a context  of  not  their  own 
making. 
93 MfAA B1.213/75, Bericht über einige wichtige Seiten der Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft in der SAR, 
über meine Tätgikeit in der SAR im IV.Quartal 1968 und über die Schlussfolgerungen für die weitere  
Arbeit, GK der DDR in der SAR an MfAA, Abteilung Arabische Staaten, Damascus, January 26, 1969,  
Heid.
94 See Robert J.C. Young, Postcolonialism, A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2003); Mezzadra, 2008, 
Rist, 1996, and also Alain Richards, John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder, 
1998).
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The  relationship  among  the  two  Germanys  and  Syria  was  consistent  with  the  international 
division of labor of that time. Both German states exported high-value-added goods, as well as 
the related know-how and managerial expertise their efficient use required to an Arab periphery 
which  relied  on  natural  resources,  cheap  labor  and  light  manufactures.  The  industrialized 
Germanys  acquired  major  surpluses  because  of  the  unbalanced  terms  of  trade  with  this 
periphery.95 Like  the  rulers  of  other  third-world  states,  the Ba’thists  advocated for  a  different 
international division of labor, and supported industrialization in the South: they called for more 
equitable  terms  of  trade  and  agreements,  which  would  provide  capital  for  technology  and 
encourage  knowledge  transfer;  these  would  have  stimulated  domestic  production  and 
consumption, as well as having later facilitated the export of manufactured goods to the world 
market.96 Thus, they did not oppose integration into the world market, but did feel that it should be 
carefully  controlled,  so  as  to  advance  domestic  priorities.  With  these  objectives  in  mind  the 
Ba’thists evaluated and experimented with two models of development. In the 1960s and early 
1970s, following Syrian requests, first Bonn and then East Berlin dispatched to Syria hundreds of  
engineers, agronomists, geologists, economists, and political advisors. 97 
The two Germanys and Syria had their own approaches to modernization, but they all  
shared some common features: state-power enhancement, reliance on technological progress, 
and industrialization. For all three, modernity was equated with instrumental rationality as well as 
with capital and labor mobility. The overall main goal of each state was the development of an 
industrial  society  based on technological progress.98 Despite such similarities,  the FRG’s and 
GDR’s models diverged for two major, substantial factors: first, the two models offered different  
financial  and  technical  conditions  for  trade,  loans  and  scientific  cooperation;  second,  they 
addressed different  social  groups whose claims and ambitions increasingly  clashed with  one 
another,  as  national  independence  fed  both  political  consciouness  and  individual/collective 
mobilization. 
Obviously, the new political cleavages embedded within capitalism and nationalism could 
not but combine with the changing social structures and the political cultures of every individual 
state. The Syrian Ba’th Party selected some major features of the socialist institutional model for 
domestic and strategic  reasons:  still  lacking  broad popular  support,  it  relied on a centralized 
organizational model to build its own constituencies and hold on power; the state-led economic 
95 See Rapport économique from 1963 to 1972 (Damascus: OAPD); Paul Bairoch, Storia economica e 
sociale del mondo (Turin, 1999), 1311-1329.
96 Alain Richards and Johan Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder, 1998), 21; Giovanni 
Balcet, Industrializzazione, multinazionali e dipendenza tecnologica. L’esperienza dei Paesi arabi esportatori di  
petrolio (Turin, 1980), 85.
97 Usually, they worked in ministries or in state-related institutions, like universities, research centers, 
factories, and cooperatives, Bericht nr. 39/66, Aktivitäten der SBZ in Syrien, Damascus, February 19, 
1966, Pfeiffer,  PAAA B36 IB4 Band 254; Bericht nr. 108/64,  Die Tätigkeit Westdeutschlands in der  
SAR, February 14, 1964, Gaile, Sapmo-Barchiv, DY 30 IV 2/20 Band 875.
98 See David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford, 1990), 10-38, 98-112; and David S. Landes, The 
Unbound Prometheus, Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the  
Present (Cambridge, 1969), 535-555.
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planning provided the regime with the administrative capacity to collect capital and granted the 
political autonomy to enforce its rules over economic and political opposition forces. Last but not  
least, the socialist camp provided Syria the much needed political and material support for the 
disruptive conflict with Israel. In the case of Syria, the GDR approach to modernization proved 
more successful but its influence depended heavily on the political fortunes of its Syrian partners. 
The former FRG ambassador, Dr. Mangold, labelled the Ba’thists’ politics as “die pragmatische 
Politik des improvisierten Sozialismus”99. Without sharing his disdain, one can conclude that he 
was correct, in the sense that major transformations in Syria rarely if ever followed linear paths; 
rather,  they were based on a  learning–by-doing  process and were consequently open to the 
forces and contingencies of political struggle.
99 “The pragmatic politics of an improvised socialism”, Bericht nr.83/64,  Bericht über die Unruhen in  
Hama, April 16, 1964, Mangold, PAAA B36 IB4 Band 125.
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